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Institutions and Opportunistic Behavior:
Experimental Evidence.
Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González and Praveen Kujal

Abstract: Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against
opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or
how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online
experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior.
We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the
collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism
individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals
strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they are chosen collectively through
voting. We also find that the presence of risk mitigating institutions crowds out reciprocity.
Reciprocity is lower when the no-insurance option is chosen among other insurance options
than when it is not available. Finally, we also observe higher gains from exchange in lowopportunism groups than in more opportunistic ones.
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Arrow (1972, p.357): “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a certain period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack
of mutual confidence”.

1.

Introduction

For long society has responded by developing institutions to mitigate opportunistic behavior
and minimize losses in profitable exchanges. Certifying agencies, enforcers, public notaries,
courts, police forces, are all examples of (costly) risk mitigating institutions put in place by
society to help minimize the risk of default in economic transactions. In this paper we try to
understand the causes and consequences of an (risk-mitigating) institution that is chosen by
individuals to protect themselves against the opportunistic behaviors of others. We focus on
how the presence of opportunistic behavior affects the choice of insurance levels and future
actions.
We pay special attention to the role of mechanisms adopted in choosing such institutions.
Keeping this goal in mind, we set up risk-mitigating institutions that can be chosen
individually or collectively (i.e., voted upon). It is important to explore this dimension,
because the mechanisms for choosing the level of protection may affect the outcome and
thereby social welfare. In terms of consequences, we focus on the impact of the presence of
insurance providing institutions on individual pro-sociality.
Although, there is some research on the relation between trust and regulation (see the
literature review), the likely co-determination of trust and regulation implies that there are
serious difficulties in clearly establishing causality. Actions, in the present or future, may be
an important determinant of the choice of institutions, a feature that is hard to measure with
secondary data. It is also difficult to shed light on exactly who demands these institutions,
and their subsequent actions, from real world data where individual actions are mostly
unobservable. In our experimental design we can trace this link, i.e. we can map demands for
institutions into subsequent actions. The advantage of the experimental methodology is that
it allows us both to suppress institutional and environmental confounding factors that
characterize field data, and to understand what principles are in operation (Plott, 2001).
2

We conduct a large-scale online experiment with 1564 participants using Amazon
Mechanical Turk. A modified version of the standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe,
1995) in the first part of the experiment is used to determine (through strategy method) the
level of trust and trustworthiness of the participants. Trustworthiness is used as it is based on
social preferences and may reveal the trustee’s intentions such as reciprocity (Bohnet, 2010;
Rabin, 1993). The first part of the experiment is the same across all treatments.
Given their choices in the first part of the experiment, individuals are allocated to a low-,
or high-, trustworthiness groups in the second part. We classify low (high) -trustworthiness
individuals as high (low) -opportunism. Individuals are informed about the group they have
been assigned to and then get to choose, individually or collectively (through voting),
between different levels of insurance which protects them against future opportunistic
behavior. Insurance is costly and ensures that at least a part of the money sent will be returned
to the sender. Higher levels of insurance imply higher guaranteed returned amounts and are
costlier to society resulting in reduced rents from exchange.
We introduce two treatment variations in the second part. This allows us to study different
mechanisms used in the choice of risk-mitigating institutions. In the first, the individual
choice treatment, senders individually decide amongst four possible insurance levels (with
‘no insurance’ also being one of the options). In the second, the collective choice (voting)
treatment, all players in the group vote for their preferred insurance level. The most voted
insurance level is then implemented for the group. The two treatments are designed to mimic
the role of (costly) risk-mitigating institutions as a substitute for mutual lack of confidence
and their impact on opportunistic behavior.
We now briefly summarize the main results. First, there is a significant demand for
insurance in both treatments and this depends on the level of opportunism of the group. When
individually chosen, those in the high-opportunism group demand greater insurance than
those in the low-opportunism group. When collectively chosen, the demand for insurance
does not differ across groups. This is quite an intriguing result that is explained by the
strategic behavior of high-opportunism individuals and the manner in which insurance levels
are chosen. In the individual-choice treatment the insurance level is chosen by the sender,
whereas in the collective-choice treatment both senders and receivers vote for the level of the
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insurance. This is important, as voting upon an insurance level can have its consequences in
that high-opportunism, i.e. non-reciprocating, individuals can vote strategically to take
advantage of future interactions by voting for a lower level of insurance. We conduct an
additional treatment where only senders can vote for the level of institutions. In this
treatment, high-opportunism senders vote for higher levels of insurance, behaving exactly as
those in the individual choice treatment, which supports the hypothesis of strategic
(opportunistic) voting. This result is consistent with the fact that countries with higher levels
of opportunistic behavior have more bureaucratic procedures and controls in place (Pinotti,
2012; Aghion, Algan, & Cahuc, 2011). This higher level of institutional control could
possibly be due to a higher demand for protection. Actually, in societies with high levels of
opportunism, where institutions are selected collectively, the level of protection demanded
by citizens is likely to be high1.
Second, low-opportunism individuals return less as higher levels of insurance are selected,
showing that risk mitigating institutions crowds out reciprocity. On the contrary, highopportunism individuals return more with higher levels of insurance as they are forced by the
higher minima of the insurance.
Finally, we find that opportunism in the first part of the experiment is lower than in the
second. This suggests that the possibility of individually choosing, or collectively voting for
institutions can crowd out civic behavior. There are, however, four changes that could affect
opportunistic behavior in the second part. First, insurance options are introduced in the
second part, and the possibility of demanding institutions can crowd out civic behavior.
Second, in the second part the participants are assigned and then informed about the group
to which they belong, and this could also affect their choices. Third, the level of insurance in
the second part is chosen/voted by other players, and fourth, senders were not allowed to
send nothing in the second part.
We introduce four additional treatments to disentangle which mechanism is at play. In a
first additional treatment, the players were divided into groups, and the receiver had the same
set of choices as in the first part. The only innovation between the first and the second part
was that participants knew whether they were in a high or a low-opportunism group. The
1

Unless there is an extremely high fraction of opportunistic individuals voting strategically.
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second additional treatment introduced different levels of insurance, but the level was chosen
by nature and not by the group members. In the third and fourth additional treatments we
added the possibility for the sender not to send anything and avoid opportunistic behavior by
avoiding exposure. We still observe crowding out.
Having the possibility of choosing risk-mitigating institutions significantly increases the
difference in the amount returned between the first and second part of the experiment for the
low-opportunism group. With these additional treatments we can show that the crowding out
of reciprocity for the low-opportunism group is in-fact due to the presence of risk-mitigating
institutions and is not an outcome of whether insurance levels are individually, or
collectively, chosen. Being informed about their respective groups, i.e. low or high
opportunism group, also affects the amount returned in the second part, but the effect of the
ability to choose insurance levels is greater. Importantly, the presence of risk-mitigating
institutions, or the release of information about the group they are in, does not result in any
significant difference for the low-opportunism group. This could suggest that in countries
that choose institutions that provide high protection levels, the institutions themselves affect
the opportunistic behavior of individuals (Lowes et al 2017).
Results in our paper are consistent with the fact that more trustworthy societies demand
less institutions and are more efficient (see Pinotti, 2012; Aghion, Algan, & Cahuc, 2011).
We also observe higher gains from exchange in low-opportunism groups than in highopportunism ones. From a policy perspective, one important lesson is that protection against
opportunism cannot be the exclusive remit of the public sector. Voters will be concerned
about the times when they are the opportunists themselves. The second big message from
this perspective is that institutions against opportunism can crowd out part of the civic spirit
that sustains cooperation, so when initiated, they should be sufficiently robust so that the
situation does not end up being worse than without them.
We show that many of our results can be rationalized using a very simple theoretical
framework based on standard models from the literature. First, to understand sender behavior
all that is needed is some heterogeneity in preferences and expectations, and that on average
they are correct in that receivers in the high-opportunism group are indeed more
opportunistic. This leads to a higher frequency of more protective contracts in that group and,
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mechanically, to lower total efficiency, in accordance with our experimental observation.
Second, for receivers, a model with social preferences and reciprocity as in Charness and
Rabin (2002) does a good job at rationalizing behavior. For example, the crowding out
phenomenon we observe can be explained if the presence of contracts leads to a lower weight
of the payoff of the sender. This could happen because contracts can be seen as a form to
dilute responsibility for the others’ welfare.

The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some related
literature. Section 3 is devoted to the experimental design. Section 4 proposes a theoretical
framework. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes.
2.

Related literature
The majority of the related literature has focused on using trust2 measures from surveys

to study the impact on economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), the impact of lack of
trust on demand for regulation (Aghion and Giuliano, 2011) or differences in regulation
captured y differences in trust (Pinotti, 2012). Knack and Keefer (1997) show a strong
relationship between trust and economic growth.3 After the correlational work of Knack &
Keefer (1997), a growing literature has analyzed the causality path between trust and
economic growth. For example, Tabellini (2010) or Algan and Cahuc (2010).4

2

Trust has been defined in a variety of ways, but a common element (see e.g. Doney, Cannon, & Mullen,
1998) is the disposition of individuals (or collective decision makers) to be placed in a situation where others
can take advantage of them, in the expectation that such a situation leads instead to mutual benefit.
3
Trust has also been positively associated with better public education (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Putnam,
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997), the organizations of firms (Fukuyama, 1995; La Porta et al.,
1997; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), the labor market (Algan & Cahuc, 2009, Aghion et al., 2011), public service
(Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), regulation (Aghion et al., 2011), financial outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza,
& Zingales, 2004, 2008, 2009), insurance (Cole et al., 2013) and research and development (Akcomak & ter
Weel, 2009).
4
Tabellini (2010) analyzes the effect of culture on economic performance using regional data from 8
European countries. Culture is measured by individual values and beliefs such as trust, respect for others or
confidence in the link between effort and economic success. To avoid reverse causality, Tabellini (2010) uses
past literacy rates and restraints on executive power as instruments for contemporaneous trust. He finds that
regions with higher levels of trust present significantly higher income per capita and higher growth rates.
Algan & Cahuc (2010) follow a different strategy. They use a time-varying instruments for contemporaneous
trust: inherited trust of immigrants. In order to exclude reverse causality, they use the trust of immigrants
inherited from their home countries as a proxy for contemporaneous trust, assuming that their level of trust is
not gradually modified by their country of residence. They find a substantial impact of inherited trust on
changes in income per capita.
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There are two closely related papers to ours that argue that trust plays an important role in
the choice of institutions. Aghion et al. (2011) propose a theoretical model where they show
that lack of trust increases the demand for regulation. They also provide correlational survey
evidence linking trust levels in various countries with support for regulation. Using data from
several countries, Pinotti (2012) argues that differences in regulation reflects concern for
market failures and shows that the variation in entry regulations around the world mostly
reflect demand pressures from individuals at large, as captured by differences in trust.
We add to this literature by providing controlled experiments where causality can be more
tightly established. More importantly, we add by showing that the method by which the
demand is expressed, individual, or collective through voting, can lead to different amounts
of insurance. Although we focus on the relationship from culture to the demand for
institutions5, Lowes et al. (2017) offer evidence of the other direction of causality: centralized
formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule-following and a greater
propensity to cheat for material gain. In this paper we show that the mere possibility of being
able to choose insurance against opportunism crowds out civic behavior. We focus on
trustworthiness, and not trust, as it can be interpreted as a measure of reciprocity (Rabin,
1993). Additionally, trustworthiness implies trust, while the converse is not true (Chaudhuri
and Gangahdharan, 2007). In addition, trust is based on expectations on the belief about
someone else’s trustworthiness (Bohnet, 2010). It also depends on a person’s willingness to
be vulnerable to someone else, and hence it may be related to her attitudes to risk (Eckel and
Wilson, 2004), her social preferences (Cox, 2004) or her willingness to accept the risk of
betrayal (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004).
We study strategic voting in the demand for risk mitigating institutions and its subsequent
impact on behavior. Bénabou & Tirole (2006) theoretically, and Cárdenas, Stranlund, &
Willis (2000), Falk & Kosfeld (2006) experimentally study how incentives may crowd out
prosocial behaviour. They find that the participants behave more selfishly when the principal
becomes more controlling. Bohnet & Beytelman (2007) find that control affects trust but not
trustworthiness. In contrast, we find that the possibility of having institutions, even if they do
not constrain participants, is enough to affect trustworthiness. We also contribute to this
5

See Alesina & Giuliano (2015), for survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship
between culture and institutions.
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literature by adding that the level of trustworthiness in the environment matters for the
crowding out.
3.

Experimental Design

3.1

The structure

Our design is motivated by our research question, i.e. given the levels of opportunism, we
are interested in how it determines the demand for risk-mitigating institutions and subsequent
behavior. The experiments were run on Amazon M-Turk on a very large sample of 1564
individuals.6
The experimental design consisted of two parts. In the first, subjects participated in a
variation of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) where player A had to decide
whether to invest her entire initial endowment of 100 points or not. If she chose to invest, the
endowment was tripled to 300. The other player, B, decided how to split the 300 points
received from player A. She could choose to return any integer amount between 0 and 300
and keep the rest for herself (in addition to her initial endowment). We used the strategy
method (Selten, 1967) and asked subjects to make decisions on both roles simultaneously. A
binary decision for player A was chosen to simplify the decision problem and obtain a unique
measure of trustworthiness.
In the second part, individuals were classified according to their level of trustworthiness
in the first part, i.e., the amount they (as Player B) returned to player A in the first part of the
game. High trustworthiness individuals who returned 150 points7 or more in the first part of
the experiment were classified as low-opportunism, whereas individuals who returned less
than 150 points were classified as having high-opportunism. Individuals in each category
were then randomly matched in groups of four and were informed whether they were in a
group whose members transferred less, or more, than 150, no other wording was used. All
participants were also informed that the criteria by which they were allocated into either
group was common knowledge.

6
7

All experimental procedures were approved by the ethics committee at Middlesex University.
The average amount returned in the first part was 155, very close to 150.
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In the second part, subjects then made decisions in another variation of the trust game (see
Table 1) where Player S had to select amongst four different insurance options (S1, S2, S3
and S4). Each option guaranteed a minimum amount returned by player R. S1 represented
the lowest level of insurance, where Player R would have the option to return to Player S any
amount between 0 and 300. Thus, S1 provided no insurance against an opportunistic receiver.
In contrast, S4 represented a situation in which Player S had the maximum coverage (her
earnings were between 100 and 150) and hence provided the highest level of insurance. Note
that, higher levels of insurance (moving from S1 to S4) imply lower overall theoretical
surplus. For example, S1 (or no insurance) generated 300 points to be distributed by player
R, whereas S4 generated only 150 points. Lower overall surplus at higher levels of insurance
reflects the costs for setting up such institutions.
Table 1. Game in Part II.
Players’ decision
Player S:
Player R: amount
selected option: allocated to player S:
S1
𝑋 ∈ [0,300]
S2
𝑋 ∈ [25,270]
S3
𝑋 ∈ [65,210]
S4
𝑋 ∈ [100,150]
3.2

Payoffs
Player S’s payoff

Player R’s payoff

X
X
X
X

400 – X
370 – X
310 – X
250 – X

Treatments

We conducted three main treatments, Purchase (n=214), All-Voting (n=207), and S-Voting
(n=320), in which we modified how the different insurance levels (S1 to S4) were selected.
We describe the three main treatments below.
Individual choice treatment. Player S chose from one of the four possible levels, S1 to S4,
of insurance.
All-Voting treatment. Here, players first had to collectively vote in groups of four
regarding the insurance level they preferred. In particular, subjects were presented with all
possible pairs of insurance levels in random order and had to decide which one they preferred
for each pair. The most popular option was then chosen.
S-Voting treatment. This treatment is identical to the All-Voting treatment except that only
the vote of players S would count for choosing the insurance level. In order to be able to
compare the results with the voting treatment, we formed groups of 8 subjects in which 4 of
9

them would be randomly selected as players S and the remaining four players would be
players R.
Clearly, the All-Voting treatment is more realistic than the S-Voting one. As we will see,
there is a significant difference in demand for insurance between the Individual-Choice and
All-Voting treatments. We conjectured that the main reason is that participants in All-Voting
anticipate that they could be Receivers (player R) with 50% probability and may thus be
negatively affected by the protection. Hence, we introduced S-Voting as an artificial
treatment that allows to directly test the conjecture that being both senders and receivers
reduces the demand for insurance.
In the voting treatments, we used an extension of Condorcet’s voting rule proposed by
(Young, 1986, 1988, 1995; Young & Levenglick, 1978) to select the most preferred insurance
level in each group. This mechanism has been shown to be incentive-compatible and difficult
to manipulate (Harrison & McDaniel, 2008).89
We also conducted a series of additional treatments which allowed us to better analyze
subject behavior, the mechanisms behind our results, and to disentangle possible
confounding explanations.
No Investment+Individual-Choice treatment (NI+Individual-Chocie). In this treatment
player S had the option “not to invest” or select one of the four insurance levels (S1, S2, S3,
S4). The “not to invest” option guaranteed 100 points to both players S and R.
No investment+S-Voting treatment (NI+S-Voting). In this treatment player S had the
option whether to invest when the insurance levels (S1, S2, S3, S4) are voted by the group
or to opt out, i.e. “not to invest”. The decision whether to invest or not was presented after
the voting decision.
Repeated trust treatment (Repeated). In this treatment, player S had only two options,
either insurance level S1 or “not to invest”.

8

We run additional treatments for robustness checks which we explain later.
Harrison & McDaniel (2008) argue that (sic) “it is a natural and intuitive extension of the idea of simple
majority rule, to allow for the possibility of Condorcet cycles forming. These cycles are avoided by searching
over all non-cyclic group rankings to find the one receiving greatest support in terms of pairwise
comparisons.” They refer to this as the ‘Condorcet-Consistent’ voting rule.
9
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Random insurance level treatment (Random). In this treatment, player S had the option
“not to invest”. If she did not choose this option then one insurance level from (S1, S2, S3,
S4) was randomly chosen by the computer.
All these treatments only differ from the previous treatments in one dimension of the
second part of the modified trust game. The NI+Individual-Choice and NI+S-Voting
treatments are identical to the Individual-Choice and S-Voting treatments except that they
include the No Investment option which allows Player S to opt out and not invest in the second
part of the game. Under this option both players S and R obtain 100 points, as in the first part
of the game. Note that, “not to invest” is dominated by S4 which guarantees 100 points to
both players and 50 additional points to be distributed by player R. The Random treatment
has the same levels of insurance providing institutions as the NI+ Individual-Choice
treatment, the only difference being that the one implemented is determined by a random
computer draw. In the Repeated treatment, the first, and second part, subgames are identical.
The only difference is that in the second part participants know that they belong to high or
opportunism groups and are matched with somebody in their own group.
3.3

Procedures

We conducted our experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk online platform. A total
of 1564 subjects (52% female; Age, M=38.46, SD=11.61) participated and the task took
approximately 20 minutes to complete.
Subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of a series of decision tasks
divided into three parts and that their earnings in each part would be determined separately.
The first two parts corresponded to the trust game described in section 3.1. In the third part
of the experiment, subjects undertook a series of tasks measuring their risk attitudes a la Holt
& Laury (2002), distributional social preferences (Bartling et al., 2009; Corgnet, Espín, &
Hernán-González, 2015), numeracy (Schwartz et al., 1997; Cokely et al., 2012), cognitive
reflection test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) and some sociodemographic characteristics. Instructions (see the Appendix) were provided at the beginning
of each part describing only the task in that part. No feedback was provided at any time
during the experiment.
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The maximum time taken was approximately 20 minutes, subject payment varies between
a minimum of $0.01 and a maximum of $8.87, and on average subjects earned $2.43 plus a
fixed payment of $0.90. Earnings were presented in points and converted to dollars according
to the exchange rate of 100 points = $1. At the end of the experiment, subjects were randomly
matched and assigned roles that determined their payments.
In Table 2 we show summary statistics by treatment for the baseline characteristics we
elicited prior to the online experiment. Balance tests using a join test of orthogonality on all
these baseline characteristics also indicate that assignment to different treatments can be
considered random.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by treatments and balance tests.
Treatment

Female

Age

Attended
college

Finished
College

Individual-Choice
(n=214)

56.54%

38.42

79.91%

52.34%

(49.69%)
45.94%
(49.91%)
48.31%
(50.09%)
51.50%
(50.10%)
53.43%
(50.00%)

(11.61)
37.33
(11.77)
37.98
(11.76)
39.06
(11.21)
39.37
(11.81)

(40.16%)
81.88%
(38.58%)
79.23%
(40.67%)
84.00%
(36.75%)
90.69%
(29.13%)

(50.06%)
50.94%
(50.07%)
52.17%
(50.07%)
55.50%
(49.82%)
64.22%
(48.05%)

51.92%

39.32

82.21%

56.25%

(50.08%)
59.72%
(49.16%)
52.05%
(49.97%)

(11.70)
38.44
(11.29)
38.47
(11.61)

(38.33%)
86.73%
(34.01%)
83.38%
(37.24%)

(49.73%)
58.77%
(49.34%)
55.37%
(49.73%)

S-Voting (n=320)
All-Voting (n=207)
Repeated (n=200)
NI+Random (n=204)
NI+ Individual-Choice
(n=208)
NI+Voting (n=211)
Total (n=1564)

Balance tests: joint test of orthogonality (p-values, using the variables above)
Individual-Choice vs. All-Voting
0.1295
Individual-Choice vs. S-Voting
0.5524
NI+ Individual-Choice vs. NI+S-Voting
0.2275
NI+ Individual-Choice vs. Random
0.9724
NI+ Individual-Choice vs. Repeated
0.3780
Note: the mean is reported and the standard deviation between parentheses.
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4.

A model to rationalize choices in the experiment
We now construct a model to organize our conjectures about choices in the experiment.

From previous existing data of behavior in trust games, the model should account for the fact
that a majority of individuals return money as receivers, so they need to have distributional
preferences. In addition, the model needs to be able to accommodate the fact that in two
identical situations from material and distributive points of view (Part 1 of the experiment
vs. Part 2: with level of insurance 1), receivers could behave differently. One model that can
accommodate both needs is the one in Charness & Rabin (2002).
Denoting 𝑥 the monetary payoff of individual i, her utility 𝑣 can be written as,
𝑣 = 𝑥 − 𝛼 − 𝜃 𝜙 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥 − 𝑥 , 0} − 𝛽 + 𝜃 𝜙 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥 − 𝑥 , 0}
In this model, the parameter 𝛼 is the baseline sensitivity of i towards j if she has a higher
payoff than herself. 𝛽 is the baseline sensitivity of i towards j if she has a lower payoff than
herself. Then, 𝜃 𝜙 modifies the baseline taking into account the attitude of i towards j based
on j`s actions, which is why this is important in our experiment. We have that 𝜙 = −1 if 𝑗
“misbehaved”, and 𝜙 = 1, if she did not. That is, if player 𝑗 “misbehaved”, player 𝑖 increases
her “envy” parameter 𝛼 (or decreases her “guilt” parameter 𝛽) by a number equal to 𝜃. In
other words, both envy and guilt are modulated (softened or increased) as a function of how
the “other” behaved previously.
We use risk neutral preferences, since in many trust games risk aversion seems to make
no difference in choices (Eckel & Wilson, 2004). This is important because it means we will
attribute the differences in choices only to beliefs and heterogeneity in β , θ , 𝜙 .
Sender behavior
To rationalize the choice of senders, we will not resort to social preferences, as it will
make the analysis unnecessarily complicated and is not really needed. In the case of senders,
the key determinant for their choices is to know how expectations will change under the
different treatments/environments. The optimal choice of contract in this case is the one
yielding highest expected monetary payoff. Formally, denoting by 𝑆 ∗ the optimal contract
choice of player i belonging to group 𝐺 , where 𝐺 is the low trustworthiness group and 𝐺
is the high trustworthiness group.
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𝑆 ∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈

, , ,

𝐸 𝑥 𝑠 ,𝐺

We hypothesize that
Assumption 1.
𝐸(𝑥|𝑠 , 𝐺 ) − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑠 , 𝐺 ) < 𝐸(𝑥|𝑠 , 𝐺 ) − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑠 , 𝐺 )
that is, senders expect lower payoff difference without protection relative to full protection
in group L than in group H. Of course, with heterogeneous beliefs between individuals it can
still be that payoff is expected to be larger under 𝑠 or 𝑠 . Nevertheless, from assumption 1
it is immediate that:
Observation 1.
𝑃𝑟(𝑆 ∗ = 𝑠 |𝐺 ) < 𝑃𝑟(𝑆 ∗ = 𝑠 |𝐺 ),
𝑃𝑟(𝑆 ∗ = 𝑠 |𝐺 ) > 𝑃𝑟(𝑆 ∗ = 𝑠 |𝐺 )
that is, the fraction of senders choosing institution 𝑠 will be lower in 𝐺 than in 𝐺 , and the
opposite is true for s4. From Table 1, adding the payoff of sender and receiver, one can see
that the surplus of the pair is always lower from higher level of institutions. From Observation
1 for every sender-receiver couple i, j we can then immediately obtain the following
observation:
Observation 2.
𝐸 𝑥 +𝑥 𝐺

<𝐸 𝑥 +𝑥 𝐺

that is, 𝐺 groups choose on average lower levels of institutions and that is automatically
associated with a higher aggregate payoff for the pair.
Receiver behavior
Receivers have no uncertainty about the action taken by senders, so the only determinant
of their choices is their social preferences and their beliefs about what is the socially
appropriate action. We expect, from behavior in previous trust games, that very few senders
will get a higher material payoff than receivers (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), so that the part of
the function related to 𝛼 (spite) will not be important for the results. In addition, it is
immediate from our assumption about the utility function of participants that:
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Observation 3.
For given values of 𝜃 and 𝜙 , the level of 𝑥 returned by player j is increasing in 𝛽 That
is, individuals with a higher level of compassion return more and variations in the level of
spite are not relevant for the results.
However, it is more difficult to establish the effect on receivers of the existence of
contracts. In order to see this, if we denote by 𝑥 the amount returned by the receiver, we first
observe:
Observation 4.
𝐸(𝑥 |𝑠 ) ≠ 𝐸(𝑥 |𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 ) implies that 𝜃 ≠ 0
This is true since for the receiver the two situations (𝑠 and 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 )10 are equivalent from
the point of view of material and distributional preferences. That is, for a given 𝑥 , the
outcome in terms of the amount of money she obtains and the sender obtains are the same
for 𝑠 and for 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 , so if θ were equal to zero, she should make the same choice in both
situations, and thus it must be that θ ≠ 0. But going beyond this observation is hard, as the
amount returned will depend on whether and how the presence of insurance changes 𝜃 .
Nevertheless, the following observation provides some guidance about what to expect.
Observation 5.
If the presence of insurance increases 𝜃 (say because it signals a social norm to return),
then 𝐸(𝑥 |𝑠 ) < 𝐸(𝑥 |𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 ). If the presence of insurance decreases 𝜃 (say because it
allows for a dilution of responsibility), then 𝐸(𝑥 |𝑠 ) > 𝐸(𝑥 |𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 ).
5.

Results

5.1

First part: Is there a need for risk-mitigating institutions?

We report the decisions of individuals A (probability of sending) and B (amount returned)
in the first part of the experiment in Table 2. We observe that around 50% decided to send
their initial endowment to A. Pairwise comparisons using proportion tests show that player
A’s behavior in the first part is similar across all treatments (Individual-Choice vs All-Voting,

10

Part1 is the first part of the experiment
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p=0.2116; Individual-Choice vs S-Voting, p=0.8324; All-Voting vs S-Voting, p=0.1157).11
More importantly for our analysis, the behavior of B´s is also not different across treatments
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcox test, MWW hereafter; p=0.8587, p=0.8591, p=0.9921).
Table 3. Probability of Sending and Amount Returned in Part 1.
Individual-Choice All-Voting
Probability of % choose A1
50.93%
57.00%
sending
Amount
Average
155.62
153.92
returned
Median
200.00
200.00
Std. Dev.
70.17
72.86
N
214
207

S-Voting
50.00%
155.20
200.00
71.71
320

We get a clear separation between the low-, and high-, opportunism groups. The average
amount returned in the high-opportunism group (M=47.88, SD=49.35) was significantly
lower than in the low-opportunism group (M=193.74, SD=20.53; MMW p<0.0001; pairwise
comparisons all p’s<0.0001). Interestingly, the probability of sending is also lower in the
high- (21.32%), relative to the low, -opportunism group (63.42%; proportion test, p<0.0001).
Its clear that across all treatments, those exhibiting low opportunism, also return larger
amounts relative to high opportunism individuals.
In the high-opportunism group, nearly 60% of the subjects make the sender worse off by
returning less than 100, while nearly 48% returned zero. By construction, subjects in the lowopportunism group returned more than 150 points (79.6% of those in the low-opportunism
group returned exactly 200) and consequently senders associated with them were always
better off. Given the large percentage of receivers who make senders worse off, riskmitigating institutions providing insurance against opportunism seem to be necessary,
especially in high-opportunism groups.

5.2. Second part: Risk Mitigating Institutions.
We now analyze the demand for risk-mitigating institutions providing insurance against
opportunism. In the second part participants decided on the level of insurance they prefer.
They could either directly choose the level of insurance they preferred or vote upon it. The
11

Using Bonferroni’s correction, the p-value threshold for significance at the 10% (5%) level is equal to
0.0333 (0.01667), in case we consider the 3 pairwise comparisons as independent tests.
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choice of the risk-mitigating institutions (Table 1) is based on the idea that setting them up
is second best from the welfare standpoint. The greater is the insurance provided, the higher
is the cost of providing it. This is reflected in the decrease in total surplus as the minimum
guaranteed amount returned to the trustor increases (from 0 for S1 to 100 for S4). In fact,
total available surplus is maximized (=300) with S1 that provides zero insurance to the trustor
and decreases subsequently as the level of the insurance for the trustor (sender) increases
with a total available surplus of 250 for S4. S1, in effect captures informal social contracts
that are at the very heart of trust dealings. However, higher levels of insurance, from S2 to
S4, reflect the price one pays for securing higher levels of risk-mitigating institutions that
provide insurance. That is, the higher the insurance provided, the greater is the cost to society.
While, S1 shows full trust towards the receiver (and zero risk-mitigating institutions per se),
S4 exhibits minimal trust and 100% security for the sender.

5.2.1. Individual-Choice treatment: S chooses the level of risk-mitigating institutions
In the purchase treatment, all S´s select the level of insurance they desire by choosing
from one of the four possible available levels. In order to analyze the demand for these we
restrict the sample to the individual-choice treatment and analyze how the choice of insurance
levels varies according to whether individuals are in a high or a low opportunism group.
Figure 1 shows that the majority of individuals (57.96%) in the low-opportunism group
demand the lowest level of insurance S1. Meanwhile, in the high-opportunism group, the
lowest level of insurance (S1) is demanded by 40.35%, with 33.33% choosing the maximum
level of insurance (S4). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and a Fisher exact test show that the
distributions by groups are different (p=0.0636 and p=0.0315, respectively). Thus,
individuals’ level of trustworthiness seems to affect the choice of insurance levels, with lowopportunism individuals being more likely to choose a higher level of insurance. This is
consistent with our theoretical Observation 1 in Section 4.

17

Figure 1. Choice of Insurance levels (Individual choice
treatment)
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5.2.2 Voting treatment: Player S votes for the level of the insurance
In the individual-choice treatment, insurance levels are chosen by individuals by paying a
price (in terms of lost surplus) for higher levels of insurance. While a price may be implicit
in the choice of insurance levels in certain situations, institutions that provide insurance
against opportunism are also chosen through collective choice, for example, they are voted
by citizens (or selected by elected politicians, who are supposed to represent the electorate’s
preferences).
We ran two treatments here, the S-Voting and All-Voting treatments. In the S-Voting
treatment only players S could vote for insurance levels while in All-Voting both players S
and R voted. Players in both treatments were presented with all possible pairs of insurance
levels in random order and had to decide which one they preferred for each pair. Then we
apply the Condorcet’s voting rule proposed (Young, 1986, 1988, 1995; Young & Levenglick,
1978) to select the insurance level provided for each group.
First, we analyze the results from the S-Voting treatment, where players S vote in groups
of 4 for the level of insurance they prefer. Out of the times they are presented with a particular
choice we compute the fraction of times subjects vote for insurance levels provided through
S1, S2, S3, and S4 in pairwise comparisons. We then analyze differences across groups for
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these proportions. Results are reported in Table 4 (first three columns). We find that the
fraction of times those in the low-opportunism group vote for the lowest level of level of
insurance (S1) is significantly higher than that for the high-opportunism group (proportion
test, p=0.0016). The opposite is true for S4 that provides the highest level of insurance
(p=0.0001). This is qualitatively similar to what we observe in Figure 1 and also is consistent
with our theoretical Observations 1 and 2 in Section 4.
Table 4. Fraction of time subjects voted for one option (with respect to another one) by
High and Low opportunism groups.
Mean
S-Voting
All-Voting
(std dev)
Levels of
Low
High
p+
Low
High
p+
Insurance
0.569
0.397
0.724
0.780
S1
0.0016
0.3768
(0.424)
(0.428)
(0.407)
(0. 388)
0.571
0.520
0.578
0.613
S2
0.1071
0.2845
(0.248)
(0.245)
(0.217)
(0.177)
0.499
0.516
0.442
0.393
S3
0.5813
0.1102
(0.256)
(0.216)
(0.202)
(0.169)
0.362
0.567
0.256
0.214
S4
0.0001
0.4951
(0.406)
(0.429)
(0.395)
(0.378)
+ This column corresponds to the p-values of a t-test comparing the High and Low opportunism groups.

Now we analyze results from the All-Voting treatment (Table 4, last three columns) where
individuals vote in groups of 4 before knowing if they will be participating as senders or
receivers. Our motivation for running this treatment is to see whether strategic voting is
observed when one can vote without knowing what role, player R or S, they will be assigned
later on. Results show that there are no differences across groups, and both high and low
opportunism groups prefer S1 with the lowest insurance level. We also observe that the
fraction of votes received declines as the level of insurance increases We analyze this
unexpected result in the following section.
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Table 5. Linear regressions on the choice of high insurance (S3 or S4 vs S1 or S2)
All individuals
(1)
(2)
Constant
0.3598***
0.4627***
(0.0329)
(0.1384)
S-Voting
0.0572
0.0328
(0.0455)
(0.0475)
All-Voting
-0.1303***
-0.1078**
(0.0453)
(0.0472)
Risk aversion
-0.0014
(0.0095)
Envy
0.0791***
(0.0201)
Compassion
-0.0731***
(0.0214)
CRT
0.0173
(0.0123)
Numeracy
-0.0166
(0.0153)
Female
0.0067
(0.0393)
Age
-0.0008
(0.0017)
Attended college
0.0197
(0.0599)
Finished college
-0.0291
(0.0446)
Trust unknown
0.0041
individuals
(0.0194)
Amount returned in
0.0002
the first part
(0.0005)
Sent in the first part
-0.2034***
(0.0449)
Observations
644
564
R2
0.0259
0.1440
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Low opportunism group
(3)
(4)
0.3057***
0.5218***
(0.0369)
(0.1776)
0.0446
-0.0066
(0.0515)
(0.0540)
-0.0557
-0.0428
(0.0528)
(0.0544)
0.0001
(0.0114)
0.0756***
(0.0220)
-0.0808***
(0.0276)
0.0152
(0.0138)
-0.0416**
(0.0179)
-0.0209
(0.0450)
0.0001
(0.0019)
0.0194
(0.0696)
-0.0529
(0.0519)
-0.0011
(0.0226)
0.0003
(0.0006)
-0.1607***
(0.0545)
466
409
0.0077
0.1304

High opportunism group
(5)
(6)
0.5088***
0.2651
(0.0668)
(0.2822)
0.0769
0.1303
(0.0894)
(0.0957)
-0.3323***
-0.2376***
(0.0858)
(0.0885)
-0.0098
(0.0181)
0.0612
(0.0517)
-0.0294
(0.0528)
0.0190
(0.0271)
0.0477
(0.0307)
0.1349
(0.0819)
-0.0037
(0.0035)
0.0045
(0.1246)
0.0826
(0.0885)
0.0451
(0.0380)
-0.0005
(0.0010)
-0.3686***
(0.0784)
178
155
0.1205
0.2701

5.2.3. Comparison across the three treatments:
Here we compare the choice of insurance levels between individuals across the three
treatments. We create a dummy variable for high insurance which takes value one if S3 or
S4 are selected, and zero otherwise, in the individual-choice treatment. In the treatments
where players S vote for the level of insurance, the high insurance variable takes value one
if options S3 or S4 are always selected by the individuals when presented in pairs against
another option. Therefore, this dummy indicates whether the individual strongly prefer
institutions S3 or S4, i.e. a fairly high level of insurance.
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In Table 5 we run a linear probability model12 with the high insurance dummy as a
dependent variable. In the first two columns we see that the treatments where players S chose
the level of insurance, or voted for it, are very similar and subjects remain equally likely to
demand high insurance levels (after controlling for individual demographics, risk aversion,
envy, CRT and numeracy tests, etc.). In contrast, when players vote for the level of insurance,
and this also affects them as player R, they select lower levels of insurance. When we divide
the sample into the low and high trustworthiness (i.e. low and high-opportunism) groups, we
see that these differences come from those who returned less (the high opportunism group)
and are also robust to the inclusion of all these controls. This shows that high-opportunism
individuals are more likely to vote strategically.
As predicted in Observation 1, we find that in the low-opportunism group most individuals
choose S1. Meanwhile, for the high-opportunism group there is a sizeable percentage of
individuals choosing S4. However, many still choose S1. The differences observed in the
All-Voting treatment may, however, be due to players’ strategic behavior. In this case,
players voted for the level of insurance without knowing what role, S or R, they will be
playing later on. From the point of view of player R, S1 is always preferable, given that it
will maximize payments if they decide to return nothing (or a small amount). From the point
of view of player S, their choice may be different depending on what group they are in. For
the low-opportunism group, players S would maximize payments choosing S1 if they expect
the other players in their group would return, as in part 1, an amount equal to or higher than
150. However, players S in the high-opportunism group would choose S4 if they expect the
other players in their group to return less than 150, as in part 1. This could explain why the
level of insurance chosen by the high-opportunism group differs across treatments.
5.3. Return Behavior.
Does return behavior change between the individual-choice and the voting treatments?
Here we analyze this by level of insurance and group. Figure 2 shows the average payments
for players S and R in the first and second part of the experiment by treatment and group.
First, we find that the average pattern is practically identical across treatments (there are only
minor differences among panels a), b), and c) in Figure 2). Second, we observe that the total

12

Results from a probit regression are very similar and available on request.
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amount of payments received decreases with the level of insurance (400 for S1, 370 for S2,
310 for S3, and 250 for S4). Third, we find strong differences in how the rents are distributed
between player S and R, depending on which group they are in. In the low-opportunism
group, players S get around 43.2% (between 39.7% and 47.7%) of the rents generated,
whereas in the high-opportunism group, player S obtain only 24.0% (between 12.1% and
42.4%) of the rents.
Interestingly, the effect of insurance levels also differs between groups. In the lowopportunism group, player S’s earnings decrease with the level of insurance. This result
seems consistent with the results of Falk & Kosfeld (2006) if players R perceive higher
insurance levels as a signal of distrust. However, in our setting the total rents decrease with
the level of insurance provided but, the relative amount sent back by recipients remained
stable across the different insurance levels, as mentioned above. In the high-opportunism
group, the pattern is the opposite. Players S’ earnings, increase with the level of insurance.
This is the case as players R are forced to increase the amount returned with the higher
minima determined by each level of insurance. In the high-opportunism group, 51.27%
(51.78%) [57.87%] {70.56%} returned the minimum amount of 0 (25) [65] {100} under S1
(S2) [S3] {S4}, whereas these proportions were significantly lower in the low-opportunism
group 2.94% (2.94%) [3.68%] {25.00%} (proportion tests, all p’s<0.0001).
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Figure 2: Payments by Treatment and Group
a) Purchase

b) All-Voting

c) S-Voting

The regression analysis reported in Table 6 confirms these results. The first four columns
of Table 6 show that for each level of insurance (S1-S4), the amount returned is significantly
higher in the high trustworthiness groups, whereas there are no significant differences across
treatments. However, differences between the high and low opportunism groups decrease
with the level of insurance. We also find that the main observable predictor of the amount
returned is the level of compassion (𝛽 ) of the participant, consistent with the theory
informing our Observation 3 in Section 4.
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Table 6. Linear regressions on the amount returned by level of insurance and the difference
between amounts returned in the first and second parts (S1) of the experiment.
(1)
S1
Constant
-13588
-16589
S-Voting
4.216
(10.519)
All-Voting
0.079
(11.319)
Low-opportunism group
95.489***
(10.579)
S-Voting x
-4.350
Low-opportunism group
(11.599)
All-Voting x
-5.572
Low-opportunism group
(12.673)
Risk aversion
-1.483
(1.025)
Envy
-0.148
(2.127)
Compassion
19.991***
(3.178)
CRT
0.043
(1.442)
Numeracy
2.819*
(1.693)
Female
1.518
(4.099)
Age
0.306*
(0.182)
Attended college
-4.344
(6.118)
Finished college
3.961
(4.360)
Trust unknown individuals
3.300
-2140
Amount returned in the first
0.107*
part
(0.062)
Sent in the first part
13.371**
-5295
Observations
637
R2
0.6105
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
S2
8038
-13004
0.560
(8.188)
-5.215
(8.534)
62.729***
(8.769)
2.431
(9.256)
5.861
(9.814)
-0.684
(0.798)
-0.736
(1.790)
17.702***
(2.515)
0.235
(1.083)
2.828**
(1.349)
-0.330
(3.347)
0.172
(0.128)
-3.446
(5.071)
1.755
(3.584)
3.052*
-1730
0.060
(0.047)
10.929**
-4322
637
0.5703

(3)
S3
61.757***
-8610
-0.963
(5.146)
-5.089
(5.212)
34.766***
(5.770)
4.293
(6.024)
7.747
(6.200)
-0.405
(0.524)
0.561
(1.220)
9.937***
(1.567)
-0.096
(0.743)
0.240
(0.941)
-1.599
(2.222)
-0.002
(0.093)
1.166
(3.289)
-2.015
(2.505)
2.136*
-1151
0.024
(0.030)
4706
-2897
637
0.4886

(4)
S4
103.087***
-3562
-1.126
(1.936)
-0.997
(2.050)
8.233***
(2.346)
-0.337
(2.418)
1.908
(2.550)
-0.167
(0.236)
-0.315
(0.543)
2.898***
(0.655)
-0.243
(0.325)
-0.333
(0.413)
-0.185
(0.987)
-0.001
(0.044)
0.047
(1.481)
-0.872
(1.121)
0.136
(0.518)
0.020
(0.013)
1565
-1264
637
0.2496

(5)
Part 1 – S1
32.107**
-16036
-0.557
(9.539)
1.129
(9.272)
37.738***
(9.432)
-0.238
(10.575)
5.068
(10.638)
1.834**
(0.880)
0.964
(2.000)
-14.034***
(2.790)
-0.952
(1.304)
-2.265
(1.610)
2.981
(3.722)
-0.341**
(0.172)
0.835
(5.887)
-3.327
(3.791)
-1.044
-1851
0.013
(0.056)
-6981
-4973
637
0.1284

In the second part, when the level of insurance is lowest (S1), there is effectively no
protection as R can always return 0 to player S. This situation is therefore the same as the
one in the first part of the game. This allows us to compare the stability of an individuals’
level of opportunism (see first two bars, Part 1 and S1 in Part 2, in Figure 2). In order to do
this, we calculate the difference in the amounts returned in the first part of the game and,
under S1 in the second part. If the difference is positive, this means that the amount returned
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in the second part is smaller than the amount returned in the first. In the last column of Table
6 we report the results of a regression of the difference in the amount returned between the
first and second part (S1).
Overall, we do not observe differences across treatments. However, we find a significant
positive effect for the low-opportunism group. This implies that the introduction of insurance
makes those in the low-opportunism group less likely to return an amount as high as the one
returned in the first part. Introducing the possibility of choosing insurance levels seems to
crowd out civic behavior differentially for the low-opportunism group, and this is robust to
controlling for risk aversion and social preferences.
Figure 3: Difference in the amount returned in the individual-choice and voting
treatments between the first and second (S1) parts by group.

Figure 3 shows the differences in return behavior between the first and second part of the
experiment for the three treatments. It can be seen that those in the low-opportunism group
are more likely to display positive differences than those in the high-opportunism one. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the two distributions are different (p-value =
0.0003).
5.4

Crowding-out of reciprocity: mechanisms
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For a given amount returned by the receiver, the outcome in terms of the amount of money
she and the sender obtain are the same in Part 1 and Part 2 under S1. Hence, from our
Observation 4 in the theory Section 4, we know that θ ≠ 0, implying that players change
their sense of “deservingness” of return behavior in the second part. The fact that there is a
decrease means, in accordance with Observation 5 in Section 4, that there is a decrease in 𝜃 ,
perhaps because it allows for a dilution of responsibility in the presence of insurance. We
will now investigate the mechanisms behind this result in more detail.
In the previous section we saw that individuals in the low-opportunism group return
significantly less in the second, than in the first, part of the experiment. This difference arises
even when the lowest level of insurance (S1) is chosen (where there is no protection and the
amounts that can be returned are the same in the first and the second part). We postulate that
this could be due to the fact that players change their sense of “deservingness” of return
behavior due to the presence of institutions. However, there could be other mechanisms at
play.
To understand this further, it will be useful to look at the changes in the experimental
design between the first and second stages. This is important as we compare the amount
returned by individuals between these two stages to establish crowding out. We see that
besides the introduction of insurance in the second part there are three changes that could
possibly confound the results. First, in the second part senders did not have the option not to
send anything (i.e. to opt out). Second, we inform subjects they belong to a group based on
the amount returned. Third, in the second part participants know that the level of insurance
is either chosen or voted by other players. The result earlier mentioned could have arisen due
to any one of these factors.
Now we explore whether any of these factors could be driving the crowding out result.
We do this by using the additional treatments where they had the option “not to invest” in
the second part. In order to understand whether the knowledge of being in the high return
group also has an additional effect on our results, we restrict our sample to the Repeated
treatment where individuals play the same game in both parts, with the only difference being
that in the second part they have information about the group they are in.
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Comparing the amount returned in the Repeated treatment for the low-opportunism group
we find that they return a smaller amount in the second part: 197.93 vs 183.14 (paired t-test,
p =0.0003). Thus, part of the effect observed is due to the fact that in the second part,
individuals are informed about the group they are in. In particular, we inform them whether
members of their group returned less or more than 150. That could change what they perceive
to be socially acceptable, or the “social norm”, and make them more likely to reduce the
amount returned. Results are different for the high-opportunism group, as subjects in the first
part returned a slightly lower, but not significant, amount than in the second part (45 vs. 51,
p=0.5458). When looking at the low-opportunism group, Figure 4 shows how the distribution
of amounts returned has a higher mass of points to the left in the second round, indicating the
decrease in the amount returned.
However, knowing the group they are in may be part of the mechanism but not the whole
answer. In what follows we compare results from this treatment to the rest to analyze the
importance of the introduction of risk-mitigating insurance. As we only observe the crowding
out effect for the low-opportunism group, we restrict our sample to this group. We then
compare the treatment mentioned above where they play the same game in both the stages
(and know their group) to the treatments where insurance levels are either chosen randomly,
individually or collectively.
As in the previous section, the dependent variable is the difference in the amounts returned
in the first and second parts (S1). Thus, a positive number would indicate a decrease in the
amount returned in the second part, compared to the first. We first test whether the
introduction of insurance further increases the crowding out effect over and above the effect
of telling subjects the group they are in (i.e. compared with the difference observed in the
Repeated treatment). We run regressions with a dummy called “NI+Insurance”, which takes
value one for NI+IndividualChoice, NI+Voting, and NI+Random treatments where insurance
is introduced, and value 0 for the Repeated treatment. Results are shown in the first column
of Table 7.
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Figure 4. Distribution of amounts returned in the first and second rounds, lowopportunism group in the Repeated treatment.

We find that introducing the possibility of choosing insurance levels significantly
increases the difference between the amount returned in the first and the second parts
(𝛽(𝑁𝐼 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 11.673, 𝑝 = 0.018 ), and the effect is larger than the effect of
telling them the group they are in, which is the reference category. This means that the
introduction of insurance affects crowding out, over and above the effect of telling subjects
about the group they are in.
In the second column we introduce another dummy called “NI+IndividualChoice” that
indicates the treatments that introduce insurance that is chosen, either directly
(NI+IndividualChoice) or by voting (NI+Voting). The “NI+IndividualChoice” dummy
variable takes value one for NI+ IndividualChoice and, NI+Voting treatments, and value 0
for the Repeated and NI+Random treatments. Results in this column show that however,
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once insurance is introduced, the fact that it is chosen does not have a significant effect
(𝛽(𝑁𝐼 + 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒) = −2.042, 𝑝 = 0.661).
Overall, this allows us to conclude that, even if telling subjects about the group they are
in affects crowding out, the introduction of insurance has a significantly larger effect, and it
does not matter whether insurance is chosen by the other player, just the mere presence of
insurance is enough to change subjects’ sense of “deservingness” of return behavior in the
second part.
Table 7. Crowding out of civic spirit. Linear regressions on
the difference between amounts returned in the first and
second parts (S1) of the experiment.
Constant
NI+Institutions

(1)
61.546***
(17.801)
11.673**
(4.908)

NI+IndividualChoice
Risk aversion
Envy
Compassion
CRT
Numeracy
Female
Age
Attended college
Finished college
Trust unknown individuals
Expected amount returned
(first part)
Sent in the first part
Observations

-0.233
(1.218)
3.795*
(2.203)
-15.321***
(3.530)
1.592
(1.613)
-3.702**
(1.533)
-5.952
(4.358)
-0.152
(0.183)
17.086***
(6.011)
-7.946
(5.487)
0.252
(2.650)
-0.062
(0.060)
-2.104
(4.815)
516

R2

0.1239
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(2)
62.154***
(17.790)
12.894**
(5.733)
-2.042
(5.588)
-0.237
(1.218)
3.731*
(2.257)
-15.256***
(3.563)
1.490
(1.686)
-3.744**
(1.528)
-5.952
(4.362)
-0.153
(0.183)
16.906***
(6.082)
-7.943
(5.498)
0.237
(2.653)
-0.062
(0.060)
-1.919
(4.846)
516
0.1242

5.5.

Economic cost: Low vs High Opportunism group.

In this section we investigate the economic costs of being in a high-opportunism group.
We take advantage of the fact that in the NI+ IndividualChoice treatment the participants had
the option “Not to invest” in addition to choosing one of the four levels of insurance as in the
Purchase treatment. Given that choosing any level of insurance can also increase gains for
both players (see last column in Table 8), we can use this to compute the benefits of exchange
lost due to lack of trust in this treatment.
Table 8. Economic costs of high opportunism. Proportion of individuals who choose each
level of insurance by group.
Low-Opportunism
High-Opportunism
Level of insurance
Total rents
group
group
Not to invest
13.38%
29.41%
200
S1
52.23%
31.37%
400
S2
10.19%
5.88%
370
S3
12.74%
7.84%
320
S4
11.46%
25.49%
250
N
157
51
We find that a smaller proportion of the low-opportunism individuals (13.38%) decided
not to invest, while this proportion was significantly larger (29.41%) in the high-opportunism
group (test of proportions, p=0.0085). In Table 8 we can see the proportion of individuals
who chose each type of insurance level. If we multiply each proportion by the size of the pie
given by each type of insurance level, we get that while the gains from trade in the lowopportunism group are of 341.53, in the high-opportunism group this is 294.12.
6.

Conclusions
The importance of risk-mitigating institutions in exchange and governance has been long

appreciated and cannot be overstated. These institutions either emerged endogenously in
early societies or are voted upon as in recent times. For example, in early trade it was common
to see the use of endogenously developed social networks to enforce trust and trustworthiness
in exchange (Greif, 1993; Ghosh, 1993; Sealand, 2013) or to facilitate co-operation (Ostrom,
1990). Evidence points out that such risk-mitigating institutions endogenously arose out of a
participative process (mutual agreements, social networks, voting, etc..) or were imposed
upon through legal dictate. Interestingly, how the choice of these institutions impacts future
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actions of the participating agents is little studied. Clearly, the importance of understanding
this link in the design of risk-mitigating institutions cannot be understated.
In this paper we have attempted to understand the causes and consequences of riskmitigating institutions chosen by individuals given their return behavior in the trust game.
We call those that return a high amount as being a low-opportunism type, and those that
return a lower amount as being a high-opportunism type. We study how the demand for
insurance depends on the level of return behavior and on the manner in which it is chosen:
individually or collectively. We obtain several new results. First, we find that there is a
significant demand for risk-mitigating institutions and that it depends on whether there is a
low or a high opportunism environment. When insurance levels are individually chosen or
voted upon only by the senders, individuals in the low-return (high-opportunism) group
demand higher levels of insurance than those in the high return (low-opportunism) group.
However, when voted upon by all individuals, the demand for insurance is the same across
both groups. This is explained by the fact that high-opportunism individuals vote strategically
to take advantage of future interactions by voting for low levels of insurance.
The behavior of receivers is similar across treatments and those in the high-opportunism
group increase the amount returned as the level of insurance increases. However, those in the
low-opportunism group return less as the insurance level increases. We find that the return
behavior in the first part of the experiment is higher than in the second. We show that this is
mostly explained by the introduction of risk-mitigating institutions, that crowd out civic
behavior.
Our experiment is static, and in our context, risk-mitigating institutions are a substitute for
trust. In this way we miss a potentially important dynamic effect, where good institutions and
high insurance can foster trust, create a social norm, and eventually become unnecessary.
Historical research, such as Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2016), suggests that good
institutions can enhance civic virtue in the long run. We believe that this is an important
agenda for future experimental research in this context.
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APPENDIX - Instructions
PART I - This is the first part of the HIT.
In this part you are going to be paired with another individual in the experiment. One of
you will be player A and another person will be player B. Before the computer randomly
determines what player each one of you will finally be assigned to be, both of you will be
asked to make decisions in the role of the two players. The decisions are as follows:

As player A. you have to choose between the following two options:
A1. 100 for yourself (player A) and 100 for player B
A2. Player B gets 400 and decides how much A and B receive (see options below).
As player B, your decisions would only apply if player A has selected option A2. In this
case, you will have to decide how many points to be allocated to player A.
Payoffs: Your earnings will be:
If player A chooses A1:



Player A’s earnings = 100
Player B's earnings = 100

If player A chooses A2:



Player A’s earnings = "amount allocated to player A" (selected by player B)
Player B's earnings = 400 – "amount allocated to player A" (selected by player B)

Note that player B can allocate any number between 0 and 300 to Player A, so Player B’s
earnings will always be at least 100 points.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly pair you
with another person in the experiment. Then the computer will randomly determine which
role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player you have been
paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been randomly assigned by the
computer, your decision and the decision of the other player.
Please answer carefully the following two questions regarding the instructions above:
1. If player A chooses A1
a. Player B gets 400 and decides how much A will receive
b. Player B obtains 0
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c. Player B obtains 100
2. If player A chooses A2 and player B allocates 200 to player A …
a. Player B will obtain 0
b. Player B will obtain 200
c. Player B will obtain 400
Please select an option as ‘Player A’ and another option as ‘Player B’.
As player A, you have to choose between the following two options:
A1. "100 for yourself (player A) and 100 for player B" (1)
A2. "Player B gets 400 and decides how much A and B receive (see below)"
As player B, select how many points you want to allocate to player A, if player A chooses
option A2:
0

300

At the end of the survey, the computer will randomly pair you with another person and
determine what player you will be playing. Then, depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the other player,
your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player you have been paired with, are determined as
follows:
If Player A chooses option A1:



Player A’s earnings = 100
Player B's earnings = 100

If Player A chooses option A2:



Player A’s earnings = "amount allocated to player A" (selected by player B)
Player B's earnings = 400 – "amount allocated to player A" (selected by player B)

Note that player B can allocate any number between 0 and 300 to Player A, so Player B
earnings will always be at least 100 points.

36

PART I - This is the second part of the HIT.
Purchase treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with one individual who, like you, decided to allocate
more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first task).
One of you will be player S and another one will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what player each one of you will be, both of you will be asked to
make decisions in the role of the two players S and R.
As player S you will have to choose among options S1, S2, S3, and S4.
As player R, you will choose the amount to be allocated between you and player S for each
possible option (S1, S2, S3 or S4) chosen by player S. The total amount to be allocated, as
well as player R’s payoffs, depends on the option implemented.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the other player as
shown in the table below:
Players' decisions

Payoffs

Player S

Player R:
"amount allocated to player
S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

S1

between 0 and 300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S2

between 25 and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S3

between 65 and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

S4

between 100 and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"
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Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S. You choose option
S3 and the player R you are matched with allocates 130 points to you. Then your earnings
will be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (the other player): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R. Suppose that the
other player chooses option S2 and you allocate 190 points to player S. Then your
earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, choose an option:





S1
S2
S3
S4

As player R, select below, using the sliders, the amount to be allocated to player S.
Remember that the amount of points that can allocate to player R depends on the option
selected by player S
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S-Voting treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with 7 other individuals who, like you, decided to
allocate more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first
task).
Four of you will be player S and the other four will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what player each one of you will be, all of you will be asked to make
decisions in the role of the two players S and R. Then, you will be paired with one
individual in your group who has been assigned a different role than yours.
As player S, you and the other 3 individuals who are selected to be player S will vote for
the option (S1, S2, S3 or S4) that you would like to be implemented. This procedure works
as follows. The four available options (S1, S2, S3 and S4) will be presented to each one of
you in six pairs. You will have to choose which option of each pair you prefer. For
example, when confronted with the choice between S1 and S2 you have to say whether you
prefer S1 or S2, the same when confronted with the choice between S1 and S3, and so on.
After everybody has voted, the most popular option will be chosen among those who are
selected to be player S.
As player R, you will have to choose the amount to allocate between player R and player S
for each possible option (S1, S2, S3 or S4) chosen by the other four players S. The total
amount to be allocated, as well as player R’s payoffs, depends on the option implemented.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the others player as
shown in the table below:
Players' decisions

Payoffs

Player S

Player R:
"amount allocated to player
S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

S1

between 0 and 300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S2

between 25 and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"

39

S3

between 65 and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

S4

between 100 and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"

Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S. The option selected
by the vote of all 4 subjects who have been selected as players S (including yourself) in the
group (as player S) is option S3 and the other player you are matched with (as player R)
chose to allocate 130 points to player S for option S3. In this case, your earnings would be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (other player you have been matched with): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R. The option selected
by the vote of the other 4 subjects who have been selected as player S (not including
yourself) in the group (as player S) is option S2 , and you (as player R) chose to allocate
190 points to player S for option S2. In this case, your earnings would be:
Player S (other player you have been matched with): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, select what option you prefer for each pair:
[Please note that your vote will count only if you are selected as Player S]


S1 vs S2, S1 vs S3 S1 vs S4, S2 vs S3, S2 vs S4, S3 vs S4
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As player R, select the amount to allocate to player S for each possible option selected by
players S:
[Please note that your choice here will be implemented only if you are selected as Player R]
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All-Voting treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with 3 other individuals who, like you, decided to
allocate more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first
task).
Then, you will be paired with one individual in your group. One of you will be player S
and another one will be player R. Before the computer randomly determines what player
each one of you will be, both of you will be asked to make decisions in the role of the two
players S and R.
As player S, you and the other 3 individuals in your group will vote for the option (S1, S2,
S3 or S4) that you would like to be implemented. This procedure works as follows. The
four available options (S1, S2, S3 and S4) will be presented to each one of you in six pairs.
You will have to choose which option of each pair you prefer. For example, when
confronted with the choice between S1 and S2 you have to say whether you prefer S1 or
S2, the same when confronted with the choice between S1 and S3, and so on. After
everybody has voted, the most popular option will be chosen.
As player R, you will have to choose the amount to allocate between player R and player S
for each possible option (S1, S2, S3 or S4). The total amount to be allocated, as well as
player R’s payoffs, depends on the option implemented.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the others player as
shown in the table below:
Players' decisions

Payoffs

Player S

Player R:
"amount allocated to player
S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

S1

between 0 and 300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S2

between 25 and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"
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S3

between 65 and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

S4

between 100 and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"

Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S. The option selected
by the vote of all 4 subjects (including yourself) in the group (as player S) is option S3 and
the other player you are matched with (as player R) chose to allocate 130 points to player S
for option S3. In this case, your earnings would be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (other player you have been matched with): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R. The option selected
by the vote of all 4 subjects (including yourself) in the group (as player S) is option S2 ,
and you (as player R) chose to allocate 190 points to player S for option S2. In this case,
your earnings would be:
Player S (other player you have been matched with): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, select what option you prefer for each pair:
[Please note that your vote will count only if you are selected as Player S]


S1 vs S2, S1 vs S3 S1 vs S4, S2 vs S3, S2 vs S4, S3 vs S4
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As player R, select the amount to allocate to player S for each possible option selected by
player S:
[Please note that your choice here will be implemented only if you are selected as Player R]
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NI+Purchase treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with one individual who, like you, decided to allocate
more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first task).
One of you will be player S and another one will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what player each one of you will be, both of you will be asked to
make decisions in the role of the two players S and R.
As player S you will have to choose among options S0, S1, S2, S3, and S4.
As player R, you will choose the amount to be allocated between you and player S for each
possible option (S1, S2, S3 or S4) chosen by player S. The total amount to be allocated, as
well as player R’s payoffs, depends on the option implemented.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the other player as
shown in the table below:
Players' decisions
Player S
S0

Payoffs

Player R:
"amount allocated to player
S"
-

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

100

100

S1

between 0 and 300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S2

between 25 and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"

S3

between 65 and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

S4

between 100 and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"
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Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S. You choose option
S3 and the player R you are matched with allocates 130 points to you. Then your earnings
will be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (the other player): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R. Suppose that the
other player chooses option S2 and you allocate 190 points to player S. Then your
earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Example C: The computer randomly determines that you are player R . Suppose that the
other player chooses option S0. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 100 points
Player R (you): 100 points
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, choose an option:


S0



S1



S2



S3



S4
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As player R, select below, using the sliders, the amount to be allocated to player S.
Remember that the amount of points that can allocate to player R depends on the option
selected by player S
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NI+S-Voting treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with 7 other individuals who, like you, decided to
allocate more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first
task).
Four of you will be player S and the other four will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what player each one of you will be, all of you will be asked to make
decisions in the role of the two players S and R. Then, you will be paired with one
individual in your group who has been assigned a different role than yours.
There are four possible environments: E1, E2, E3, and E4. Only one of these four
environments will be implemented.
As player S you will have to make two sets of decisions.


First, you and the other 3 individuals who are selected to be player S will vote for
the environment (E1, E2, E3 or E4) that you would like to be implemented. This
procedure works as follows. The four available options (E1, E2, E3 and E4) will be
presented to each one of you in six pairs. You will have to choose which option of
each pair you prefer. For example, when confronted with the choice between E1 and
E2 you have to say whether you prefer E1 or E2, the same when confronted with the
choice between E1 and E3, and so on. After everybody has voted, the most popular
environment will be chosen among those who are selected to be player S.



Second, for each possible environment you will choose between two possible
options, as described below.
Environment E1: Choose between option T1 or option S1
Environment E2: Choose between option T2 or option S2
Environment E3: Choose between option T3 or option S3
Environment E4: Choose between option T4 or option S4

As player R, you will choose the amount to be allocated between you and player S for each
possible option (S1, S2, S3, or S4). The total amount to be allocated, as well as player R’s
payoffs, depends on the environment voted by the four players S and the options selected
by both players for that environment.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
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whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on what environment is
randomly selected by the computer, the role you have been randomly assigned by the
computer, your decision and the decision of the other player as shown in the table below:
Players' decisions
Environment
voted

E1

E2

E3

E4

Payoffs

Player
S

Player R:
"amount
allocated to
player S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

T1

-

100

100

S1

between 0 and
300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

T2

-

100

100

S2

between 25
and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"

T3

-

100

100

S3

between 65
and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

T4

-

100

100

S4

between 100
and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"

Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S and the environment
E3 is voted by you and the other three individuals selected to be player S. Suppose that you
choose option S3 and the player R you are matched with allocates 130 points to you. Then
your earnings would be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (the other player): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R and the environment
E2 is voted by the other four individuals selected to be player S. Suppose that the other
player chooses option S2 and you allocate 190 points to player R. Then your earnings
would be:
Player S (the other player): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Example C: The computer randomly determines that you are player R and the environment
E4 is voted by the other four individuals selected to be player S. Suppose that the other
player chooses option T4. Then your earnings would be:
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Player S (the other player): 100 points
Player R (you): 100 points
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, select first what environment you prefer for each pair:
[Please note that your vote will count only if you are selected as Player S]


E1 vs E2, E1 vs E3 E1 vs E4, E2 vs E3, E2 vs E4, E3 vs E4

As player S, choose an option for each environment:


Environment E1: T1 or S1



Environment E2: T2 or S2



Environment E3: T3 or S3



Environment E4: T4 or S4

As player R, select below, using the sliders, the amount to be allocated to player S.
Remember that the amount of points that can allocate to player R depends on the option
selected by player S
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Random treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with one individual who, like you, decided to allocate
more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first task).
There are four possible environments, which are: E1, E2, E3, and E4. The computer will
randomly determine which environment you will be playing in. Each environment has
equal chances to be implemented.
One of you will be player S and another one will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what environment and what player each one of you will be, both of
you will be asked to make decisions in the role of the two players S and R for each
environment.
As player S you will have to make a decision for each environment:
Environment 1: Choose between option T1 or option S1
Environment 2: Choose between option T2 or option S2
Environment 3: Choose between option T3 or option S3
Environment 4: Choose between option T4 or option S4
As player R, you will choose the amount to be allocated between you and player S for each
possible environment: E1, E2, E3, or E4. The total amount to be allocated, as well as player
R’s payoffs, depends on the environment randomly selected by the computer and the
options selected by both players. The other individual with whom you are paired will also
make his/her decisions for both roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which environment (E1, E2, E3, or E4) and which role each of you will be playing. Your
payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with whom you have been paired with, are
determined depending on what environment is randomly selected by the computer, the role
you have been randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the
other player as shown in the table below:
Players' decisions
Environment
voted

E1

Payoffs

Player
S

Player R:
"amount
allocated to
player S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

T1

-

100

100

S1

between 0 and
300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"
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E2

E3

E4

T2

-

100

100

S2

between 25
and 270

"amount allocated to
player S"

370 - "amount
allocated to player S"

T3

-

100

100

S3

between 65
and 210

"amount allocated to
player S"

310 - "amount
allocated to player S

T4

-

100

100

S4

between 100
and 150

"amount allocated to
player S"

250 - "amount
allocated to player S"

Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S and the environment
is E3. Suppose that you choose option S3 and the player R you are matched with allocates
130 points to you. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (you): 130 points
Player R (the other player): 180 points (= 310 – 130)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R and the environment
is E2. Suppose that the other player chooses option S2 and you allocate 190 points to player
S. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 190 points
Player R (you): 180 points (= 370 – 190)
Example C: The computer randomly determines that you are player R and the environment
is E4. Suppose that the other player chooses option T4. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 100 points
Player R (you): 100 points
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, choose an option for each environment:


Environment E1: T1 or S1



Environment E2: T2 or S2



Environment E3: T3 or S3



Environment E4: T4 or S4
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As player R, select below, using the sliders, the amount to be allocated to player S.
Remember that the amount of points that can allocate to player R depends on the option
selected by player S
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Repeated treatment
PART II - This is the second part of the HIT.
Your decision as ‘Player B’ in the previous part was: "Allocate [amount returned in Part
I] points to player A."
In this part, you will be grouped with one individual who, like you, decided to allocate
more/less than 150 to player A (while making their choice as player B in the first task).
One of you will be player S and another one will be player R. Before the computer
randomly determines what player each one of you will be, both of you will be asked to
make decisions in the role of the two players S and R.
As player S you will have to choose between option S0 and option S1.
As player R, you will choose the amount to be allocated between you and player S in case
option S1 is chosen by player S. The total amount to be allocated, as well as player R’s
payoffs, depends on the option implemented.
The other individual with whom you are paired will also make his/her decisions for both
roles.
After all the individuals have made their decisions, the computer will randomly determine
which role each of you will be playing. Your payoffs, and the payoffs of the player with
whom you have been paired with, are determined depending on the role you have been
randomly assigned by the computer, your decision and the decision of the other player as
shown in the table below:
Players' decisions

Payoffs

Player S

Player R:
"amount allocated to player
S"

Player S payoff

Player R payoff

S0

-

100

100

S1

between 0 and 300

"amount allocated to
player S"

400 - "amount
allocated to player S"

Example A: The computer randomly determines that you are player S. You choose option
S1 and the other player R allocates 170 points to you. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (you): 170 points
Player R (the other player): 230 points (= 400 – 170)
Example B: The computer randomly determines that you are player R . Suppose that the
other player chooses option S0. Then your earnings will be:
Player S (the other player): 100 points
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Player R (you): 100 points
Given the table above, please make a decision for both roles:
As player S, choose an option:


S0



S1

As player R, select below, using the sliders, the amount to be allocated to player
S.Remember that the amount of points that can allocate to player R depends will only apply
if player S selects S1.
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